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We construct a cooperative sta¢ ng game to investigate how to fairly allocate the reduced number
of sta¤s among multiple call centers that pool (centralize) their capacities. We show that this game
is essential and submodular, and thereby, convex with a non-empty core. We also propose a neat
Shapley value-characterized sta¤-allocation rule, which exists in the core of the game.
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1 Introduction
The past decade has witnessed a number of successful practices in which multiple call centers
centralize their capacities to achieve scale economy or other pooling e¤ects. Such practices are
particularly common to the small spatially-separated call centers, which are more willing to be
virtually or physically pooled into a large call center. For example, a U.S. bank has four call
centers serving customers in di¤erent regions. An incoming call from a region is rst assigned to
the center that is located in the region. If the calls waiting time reaches 10 seconds, then the call will
be sent to an interqueue and then be answered by all four call centers, depending on which center
has an available agent [6]. In fact, the telecommunication technique is highly capable of realizing
the above virtual pooling system. In addition to the wide existence of the pooling of separate call
centers, such a strategy has also been implemented within a call center. For example, the agents
in a call center are usually divided into di¤erent groups serving di¤erent types of customers. Such
dedicated groups can be merged into a single group through cross-training, as discussed by Tekin,
Hopp, and Oyen [23].
The benet of pooling call centers can be illustrated through the following square-root safety
sta¢ ng rule (see, e.g., Borst, Mandelbaum, and Reiman [3]). Consider n  2 call centers i.e., call
center i (i = 1; 2; : : : ; n), which has an arrival rate i and a service rate . Let Ri = i= denote
call center is o¤ered load. The asymptotically optimal sta¢ ng level that balances call center is
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cost and its customerswaiting time can be written as Ni = Ri+
p
Ri, where  > 0 is a parameter
dependent on the sta¢ ng cost c and the customers waiting cost a [3]. Assume that a, c, and  are
the same for all call centers, which implies that  is also the same across all call centers. Under
the above assumption, the total sta¤ number needed before pooling is
Pn
i=1 i=+ 
Pn
i=1
p
i=,
and that needed after pooling is
Pn
i=1 i= + 
pPn
i=1 i=. Since
pPn
i=1 i= <
Pn
i=1
p
i=,
we nd that pooling n call centers can reduce the total sta¤ number.
Although the square-root safety sta¢ ng rule can determine the total required sta¤ number for
call centers after pooling, the rule still cannot indicate how to allocate the total sta¤ number to
each individual call center. One may note that each call center shall have an incentive to cooperate
with other(s), if and only if the number of its sta¤ is reduced as a result of pooling. A critical
question thus arises as follows: how many sta¤s shall be allocated to each call center such that all
centers are willing to pool?
In this note, we construct a cooperative sta¤ allocation game for n call centers that pool their
capacities. Assuming that the sta¤s at all call centers have similar working skills, we nd that
the centers have an identical service rate . In addition, the sta¢ ng cost c and the customers
waiting cost a are assumed to be identical at all call centers. We show that our sta¢ ng game is
essential and submodular, and thereby, convex with a non-empty core. Using the Shapley value
solution concept, we derive a unique and fair sta¤ allocation scheme, which indicates that after
pooling, the number of sta¤s allocated to call center i is Ni = Ri +   i=p, where i Pn
k=1f[(k 1)!(n k)!=(n!)]
P(n 1k 1)
li=1
(
qP
j2C(li;k) j 
qP
j2C(li;k) j   i)]g, and C(li; k) is the lith
coalition formed by k call centers inclusive of center i. We nd that the Shapley value-characterized
sta¢ ng rule is always in the non-empty core of our game; that is, such allocation mechanism is fair
and stable, and no call center has an incentive to leave the pooling coalition.
The remainder of the note is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the related literature.
Our main results are discussed in Section 3. Moreover, a brief description of cooperative game
theory which is a major methodology used in our analysis is presented in online Appendix A.
All proofs are relegated to online Appendix B. We provide a numerical example to illustrate our
cooperative game analysis in online Appendix C.
2 Literature Review
This note is related to the literature on the sta¢ ng and pooling problems for call centers. With
di¤usion approximation, Borst, Mandelbaum, and Reiman [3] considered the sta¢ ng problem of a
single-class, single-pool M=M=N queue subject to cost consideration and other constraints. Man-
delbaum and Zeltyn [16] extended Borst, Mandelbaum, and Reimans analysis [3] into a model with
customer abandonment. More publications along this line can be found in the surveys written by
Aks¸in, Armony, and Mehrotra [1] and Gans, Koole, and Mandelbaum [8].
The study on call center pooling mainly focuses on workforce management. Jouini, Dallery,
and Nait-Abdallah [13] examined the benets of migrating from a call center with all agents pooled
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together towards a call center with dedicated agent groups. The authors showed that, despite the
drawbacks of less pooling e¤ects, such change can bring some benets due to better human resource
management. Tekin, Hopp, and Oyen [23] investigated the benets of pooling dedicated groups of
agents into a general group after cross-training. They considered the impact of system parameters
such as the number of servers, and the mean and correlation of service times, on the decision on
which groups to pool. Van Dijk and van der Sluis [25] discussed the benets of pooling call centers
and showed that with multiple job types, the pooling e¤ect could be negative. Di¤erent from the
above publications, we now focus on how to fairly allocate among multiple call centers the sta¢ ng
cost saving that result from pooling their capacities.
Other relevant literature includes those publications regarding the cooperative game in queueing
systems. In fact, all early publications concerning the pooling of call centers are mainly related
to the cooperative game analysis of fairly allocating total waiting costs among waiting customers,
as discussed by, e.g., Chun ([4], [5]), Haviv [11], Haviv and Ritov [12], Katta and Sethuraman
[14], Maniquet [17], etc. Applying the theory of cooperative games to address the capacity pooling
problem for queueing systems starts in recent years. Anily and Haviv [2] addressed the problem
of how to share the cost savings among multiple one-server service systems, showing that the core
of the game is non-empty. Yu, Benjaafar, and Gerchak [29] considered a similar problem and
presented a cost-sharing mechanism where each call center is better o¤ when cooperating than
acting individually. Di¤erent from Anily and Haviv [2] and Yu, Benjaafar, and Gerchak [29] who
focused on the capacity pooling among one-server queues, we consider the sta¤ pooling among
multiple-server call centers.
3 Cooperative Sta¢ ng Game: Model and Analysis
In this section, as discussed in online Appendix A, we st calculate the characteristic values of all
possible coalitions to construct our n-center cooperative sta¢ ng game. Then we derive a unique,
fair sta¤ allocation scheme for these call centers.
3.1 Characteristic Values of All Possible Coalitions
In our cooperative sta¢ ng game, the characteristic value of a coalition is dened as the number
of sta¤ that are needed for all call centers belonging to the coalition. For the empty coalition ?,
there is no call center and therefore, the number of sta¤ is zero. Thus, the characteristic value of
the empty coalition is v(?) = 0.
Characteristic Values of One-Center Coalitions. From §1, we know that before cooperating
with any other call centers, the number of the sta¤ needed by a single call center i is Ni =
Ri +  
p
Ri (Borst, Mandelbaum, and Reiman [3]). Thus the characteristic value v(i),
i = 1; 2; : : : ; n, for one-center coalition fig is calculated as
v(i) = Ni = Ri +  
p
Ri. (1)
3
Characteristic Values of k-Center Coalitions with 2  k  n. As any subset of k (2  k 
n) call centers may form a k-center coalition, there are
 
n
k

= n!=[k!(n  k)!] possible k-center
coalitions. Without loss of generality, we now consider the lth k-center coalition, which we
denote by C(l; k), for l = 1; 2; : : : ;
 
n
k

and 2  k  n. According to Borst, Mandelbaum,
and Reiman [3], the characteristic value v(l; k), which is the number of sta¤s needed for the
coalition C(l; k), can be computed as
v(l; k) = N(l; k) = R(l; k) +  
p
R(l; k), for l = 1; 2; : : : ;

n
k

and 2  k  n. (2)
where R(l; k)  Pi2C(l;k)(i=) denotes the o¤ered load of the coalition C(l; k). Note that
there exists only one n-player (grand) coalition. We simply write the grand coalition as
C(n)  f1; 2; : : : ; ng, and its characteristic value is
v(n) = N(n) = R(n) +  
p
R(n), where R(n) 
Pn
i=1 i

.
3.2 Sta¢ ng Decision: Solution of Our Cooperative Game
To solve the sta¤ allocation problem for the n pooled call centers, we need rst examine whether
there exists a sta¤ allocation approach such that some or all call centers are willing to cooperate.
More specically, we need investigate which coalition is stable. The stability of a coalition means
that no member (call center) in the coalition has an incentive to leave the coalition. Since each call
center aims at reducing its sta¤ number and saving its operating cost, a coalition in our cooperative
sta¢ ng game is stable if and only if each call center in the coalition can hire less sta¤ after joining
the coalition.
A necessary condition for the stability of our n center cooperative game G is that the game is
subadditive, that is, v(C0 [ C00)  v(C0) + v(C00) for any two disjoint coalitions C0 and C00 in the
game ([22]). For example, assume that there are two call centers, center 1 and center 2. Before call
centers 1 and 2 cooperate, they need v(1) and v(2) sta¤, respectively; but, after the two centers are
centralized, they jointly need v(12) sta¤. If v(12) < v(1) + v(2), then we can nd a sta¤ allocation
scheme that assures the stability of the coalition f1; 2g. Otherwise, if v(1) + v(2)  v(12), then we
cannot nd a sta¤ allocation scheme to assure that both centers are willing to stay together in the
coalition f1; 2g. Hence, it is important to determine whether our game is subadditive.
3.2.1 Submodularity
A cost (sta¢ ng) cooperative game must be convex and subadditive if its characteristic function is
submodular (Driessen [7] and Topkis [24]). We learn from Driessen [7] that our game is submodular
if v(T [ fjg)  v(T )  v(S [ fjg)  v(S), for all S  T  C(n)nfjg.
Theorem 1 The characteristic function of our n player cooperative game G is submodular; thus,
the game G is convex and subadditive. 
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The above theorem implies that when more call centers form a coalition, the characteristic value
of the coalition is lower owing to the economies of scope resulting from the subadditive property
of the game. That is, as a result of pooling more centers, less sta¤ are needed and the centers
should be more e¢ cient. It thus follows that all the n centers shall have incentives to join the
grand coalition C(n).
However, for the grand coalition C(n) to be stable, we still need a su¢ cient condition; that
is, the sta¤ number v(n) shall be allocated to all call centers in a fair way. More specically, if
the number of the sta¤ assigned to each center is no more than what this center has to hire after
leaving the grand coalition, then all call centers are willing to stay in the grand coalition which
makes the grand coalition stable.
3.2.2 Fair Sta¤ Allocation Scheme
Denote mi as the number of the sta¤ allocated to center i. Then we can characterize any proper
sta¤ allocation of the characteristic value (total sta¤ number) v(n) by using an n tuple of numbers
M  (m1;m2; : : : ;mn) with the following two properties: (i) individual rationality, i.e., mi  v(i),
for i = 1; 2; : : : ; n; (ii) collective rationality, i.e.,
Pn
i=1mi = v(n). A n tuple (m1;m2; : : : ;mn)
satisfying the above two properties is called an imputation for the sta¢ ng game G = (C(n); v)
([22]). Below, in order to nd a fair sta¤allocation scheme, we need rst examine the non-emptiness
of the core (Gillies [9] and Owen [19]), which, for our game, is dened as the set of all undominated
imputations (m1;m2; : : : ;mn) such that
P
i2T mi  v(T ) for all coalitions T  C(n).
Theorem 2 The core for our n player cooperative sta¢ ng game in characteristic-function form is
non-empty. That is, the grand coalition C(n) is stable if all call centers implement a sta¤ allocation
scheme in the core. 
Since any point in the non-empty core represents a fair imputation (allocation scheme), there
could exist many sta¤ assignment schemes each assuring the stability of the grand coalition. An
important question thus arises: Which sta¤allocation scheme in the core shall be applied to allocate
the total sta¤ number v(n) among n call centers? Therefore, it would be interesting to nd a unique
sta¤ allocation scheme for our cooperative game.
According to online Appendix A, Shapley value (Shapley [21]) and the nucleolus (Schmeidler
[20]) are the two commonly-used solutions each representing a unique, fair imputation (sta¤ al-
location scheme for our sta¢ ng problem). However, to obtain the nucleolus solution, one needs
to solve a series of linear programming (LP) problems (Wang [27]); for recent applications in the
business area, see Guo, Leng, and Wang [10] and Leng and Parlar [15]. Due to the complexity of
the nucleolus, we shall avoid this solution in this note. Instead, we adopt the Shapley value solution
concept, under which the number of sta¤ allocated to call center i, i = 1; 2; : : : ; n, is calculated as
mi =
X
i2T
(jT j   1)!(n  jT j)![v(T )  v(T   i)]
n!
;
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where T denotes a possible call-center coalition that center i joins and jT j is the number of call
centers in coalition T . It is proper to use Shapley value to characterize a unique, fair sta¤ allocation
scheme for our n player cooperative game because of the following three reasons:
1. As discussed in online Appendix A, Shapley value is based on three axioms (i.e., symmetry;
zero allocation to dummy player; additivity). Clearly, our sta¢ ng problem satises the above
three axioms.
2. As discussed by Topkis [24], Shapley value for a convex cooperative game must exist in a
non-empty core. As our n player cooperative game is convex, Shapley value must be in the
non-empty core of our game and the resulting sta¤ allocation scheme can assure the stability
of the grand coalition.
3. Shapley value is a monotonic solution (Megiddo [18] and Young [28]). For our cooperative
sta¢ ng game, the monotonicity of a solution means that, if the sta¤ number for each possible
coalition decreases, then the number of the sta¤ assigned to each center shall also decrease.
Since any acceptable sta¤ allocation scheme should be monotonic, Shapley value is a proper
solution concept for our sta¢ ng problem.
Theorem 3 When we use Shapley value to allocate the total sta¤ number v(n) among n call
centers, the number of the sta¤ assigned to call center i, i = 1; 2; : : : ; n, is computed as
mi = Ri +   ip

, (3)
where Ri = i= is call center is o¤ered load and,
i 
nX
k=1
264(k   1)!(n  k)!
n!
(n 1k 1)X
li=1
rX
j2C(li;k)
j  
rX
j2C(li;k)
j   i
375 .  (4)
It is interesting to note from (3) that, when we use Shapley value to fairly allocate total sta¤
number v(n) among n call centers, the number of sta¤ assigned to call center i (i = 1; 2; : : : ; n)
is simply equal to the centers o¤ered load Ri plus an additional term (i.e.,   i=p). This
resembles the square-root safety sta¢ ng rule. Recall from Section 3.1 that, when call center i does
not cooperate with any other centers but instead serves customers by itself, this centers optimal
sta¤ number v(i) equals the o¤ered load Ri plus an addition term (i.e.,  
p
Ri =  
p
i=
p
).
The only di¤erence is that the term
p
i in the latter is replaced by i in the former. The following
theorem shows the order between them.
Theorem 4 For call center i = 1; 2; : : : ; n, i <
p
i. 
Theorem 4 implies that for our n player cooperative game, the Shapley value-characterized
sta¤ number mi for center i is smaller than v(i). That is, if n call centers cooperate to jointly
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serve customers, then the sta¤ number for each call center must be smaller than that when these
centers operate independently. In fact, this important result conrms our Theorems 1 and 2 : If
the call centers do not operate independently but decide to cooperate, then the resulting n player
cooperative game must be submodular with a non-empty core. Moreover, as discussed previously,
Shapley value must exist in the non-empty core. Therefore, when we use (3) to assign sta¤ among
n call centers, all the centers are better o¤ by cooperating with each other than by operating
independently and thus the grand coalition C(n) is stable.
Corollary 1 If n call centers cooperate to form the grand coalition C(n) instead of operating
independently, call center i (i = 1; 2; : : : ; n) can reduce its sta¤ number by (
p
i   i)=p, where
i is given as in (4). 
Note that a cost cooperative game with n player is essential if
Pn
i=1 v(i) > v(n) ([22]). We can
further conclude that our cooperative sta¢ ng game is essential since
Pn
i=1 v(i) >
Pn
i=1mi = v(n).
This property demonstrates that the pooling of n call centers can essentially improve the e¢ ciency
of system-wide operation.
Remark 1 When we calculate v(i) and v(l; k) in Section 3.1 and compute the Shapley value-
characterized sta¤ number mi by using (3), the resulting number of sta¤ could be a decimal number
rather than an integer. For such case, one may believe that we need to round that decimal number
to an integer. This is unnecessary. In reality, a rm may hire both full-time and part-time sta¤. A
decimal sta¤ number indicates that the center hires some part-time sta¤. For example, if mi = 2:3,
then the call center i can hire two full-time sta¤ and one part-time sta¤ who works at the center
for only 30% of normal working time. C
A numerical example is provided in online Appendix C to illustrate the above analysis.
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Online Supplements
A Fair Sta¤ Allocation Rule for the Capacity Pooling of Multiple Call Centers
P. Guo, M. Leng, Y. Wang
Appendix A Brief Description of Cooperative Game Theory
Consider n  2 call centers pool together to reduce their operations (sta¢ ng) cost. We study
how each call center decides on its sta¢ ng number after pooling. Since the theory of cooperative
games is a major methodology used in our analysis of the sta¢ ng problem, we briey discuss some
important solution concepts in this theory.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern [26] develop a theory of multi-person games where various
subgroups of players might join together to form coalitions. For our cooperative game where
the n call centers may form di¤erent coalition structures to cooperate, we construct a game in
characteristic-function form by computing the characteristic values of all possible coalitions. More
specically, for our game, if a single call center joins an one-player coalition, then the call center
does not cooperate with any other call centers but only operate by itself. If two or more call centers
form a multi-player coalition, then all call centers in the coalition cooperate to jointly serve their
customers.
In the theory of cooperative games, the characteristic value of a coalition is the minimum
amount that the coalition can attain using its own e¤orts only. In our note, the characteristic value
of a coalition is dened as the minimum necessary sta¤ number that is needed by all call centers in
the coalition. Since any one or more call centers may form a coalition, in our n player cooperative
game, all possible coalition include the empty coalition (that does not involve any call center),
n one-player coalitions and
 
n
k

= n!=[k!(n   k)!] possible k-player coalitions where 2  k  n.
Note that, when k = n, all call centers form an n player coalition which is also known as grand
coalition. We have to compute the characteristic values for all the above possible coalitions; in §3.1,
we provide more discussions on coalition structures and corresponding characteristic values.
After building a cooperative game, we need examine whether or not all call centers are willing to
form the grand coalition; that is, we will investigate the stability of the grand coalition. This is one
of the most important questions in the theory of cooperative games. In order to assure the stability
of the grand coalition for our sta¢ ng game, we need nd a fair allocation scheme that determines
the sta¤ number for each call center. For our problem, the fairnessof an allocation scheme means
that the number of sta¤ assigned to each call center should be no more than that when the call
center leaves the grand coalition. That is, under a fair allocation scheme, none of the call centers
should have any incentives to deviate from the grand coalition, which implies that the fair allocation
scheme is undominated by any other possible scheme. To nd a fair allocation scheme, we apply
some appropriate solution concepts from the theory of cooperative games. Leng and Parlar [15]
discuss two categories of commonly-used concepts: Set-valued solution concepts and unique-valued
solution concepts; and they conclude that the core (Gillies [9]), Shapley value (Shapley [21]), and
1
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the nucleolus (Schmeidler [20]) are most common solution concepts that have been widely used
in the management science/operations management eld. Next, we briey describe these three
important concepts.
The core was rst introduced by Gillies [9]. The core of an n-person cost cooperative game in
characteristic form is dened as the set of all undominated imputations (x1; x2; : : : ; xn) such that
for all coalitions T  N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng, we havePi2T xi  v(T ); see Owen [19] for the description
of the core. Although the allocation schemes suggested by the core assure stability of the grand
coalition, the core could be empty for some games. Even if the core is non-empty for our game,
we have to address the question of which allocation (sta¤ assignment) scheme should be used for
allocating the sta¤ among n call centers. Therefore, after examining whether the core is empty, we
also need to nd a unique fair sta¤ allocation scheme for our n player sta¢ ng game.
For a n-player game (n  2), there are two commonly-used solution concepts Shapley value
and the nucleolus solution. The solution concept of Shapley value represents a unique imputation
(allocation scheme) x = (x1; x2; : : : ; xn) where the payo¤s xi ,i = 1; 2; : : : ; ; n are distributed fairly
by an outside arbitrator. Shapley [22] derives the unique Shapley values (x1; : : : ; xn) as xi =P
i2T (jT j 1)!(n jT j)![v(T ) v(T   i)]=n! where T denotes a possible coalition that player i joins,
and jT j is the number of players in coalition T . The allocation scheme characterized by Shapley
value is based on the following three axioms: (i) Symmetry : two players with symmetric roles have
the same allocation. This assumes that the unique imputation only depends on the characteristic
values of all possible coalitions. (ii) Zero allocation to dummy player : the allocation to a dummy
player (who adds no value to any coalition) is zero. (iii) Additivity : for two cooperative games
(N; v) and (N;w) which have the same player set N , an acceptable allocation scheme for players
in N must be additive, i.e., (v + w)(T ) = v(T ) + w(T ), for T  N .
Even though the Shapley value can be computed easily by using a formula, the Shapley value
may not be in the non-empty core, thus making the grand coalition unstable. An alternative solution
concept is the  nucleolus (Schmeidler [20]), which denes an allocation scheme that minimizes
the unhappinessof the most unhappy coalition. More specically, for a cost cooperative game,
denote eT (x) =
P
i2T xi   v(T ) as the excess (unhappiness) of a coalition T with an imputation
x. Then the nucleolus can be found as follows: (i) First consider those coalitions T whose excess
eT (x) is the largest for a given imputation x, (ii) If possible, vary x to make this largest excess
smaller, (iii) When the largest excess is made as small as possible, consider the next largest excess
and vary x to make it as small as possible, etc. Normally, the nucleolus solution can be found by
solving a sequence of linear programming problems (Wang [27]), and in general, it may be di¢ cult
to compute this solution analytically. This restricts the applications of the nucleolus.
Appendix B Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. For our cooperative sta¢ ng game, we examine the submodularity of our
game by Driessens approach [7]. That is, we investigate if the following conditions are satised for
2
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our game: v(S [ fjg)  v(S)  v(T [ fjg)  v(T ), for all S  T  C(n)nfjg.
Assume that S and T are k1  and k2 centers coalitions with k2  k1, respectively; that is,
S = C(k1) and T = C(k2) = S [ C 0 where C 0 6= ?. Thus, the number of sta¤s for coalition S and
that for coalition T are computed as,
v(S) =
P
i2S i

+  
sP
i2S i

and v(T ) =
P
i2T i

+  
sP
i2T i

.
Using the above, we have,
v(T )  v(S) =
P
i2T S i

+
p


rX
i2T i  
rX
i2S i

. (5)
When call center j 2 C(n)   T joins coalition S, the number of sta¤ needed for the resulting
(k1 + 1) player coalition S [ fjg can be calculated as,
v(S [ fjg) = j +
P
i2S i

+
p


r
j +
X
i2S i.
Similarly, when call center j joins coalition T , the number of sta¤ for the resulting (k2+1) player
coalition T [ fjg is calculated as,
v(T [ fjg) = j +
P
i2T i

+
p


r
j +
X
i2T i.
It thus follows that
v(T [ fjg)  v(S [ fjg)
=
P
i2T S i

+
p


r
j +
X
i2T i  
r
j +
X
i2S i

. (6)
Comparing v(T )  v(S) in (5) and v(T [ fig)  v(S [ fig) in (6) yields
Z  [v(T [ fjg)  v(S [ fjg)]  [v(T )  v(S)]
=
p


r
j +
X
i2T i  
r
j +
X
i2S i

 
rX
i2T i  
rX
i2S i

.
Letting A Pi2T i and B Pi2S i, we re-write the above to
Z =
p

 [(pj +A pj +B)  (pA pB)].
Noting that
p
j +A 
p
j +B and
p
A  pB, we nd that the sign of the term [(pj +A  
3
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p
j +B)  (
p
A pB)] is the same as the sign of the following expression:
(
p
j +A 
p
j +B)
2   (
p
A 
p
B)2 = 2

j +
p
AB  
q
(j +A)(j +B)

,
which is non-positive because 2
p
AB  A+B and so j +
p
AB p(j +A)(j +B). So Z  0
and v(T [ fjg)  v(S [ fjg)  v(T )  v(S). Thus, our cooperative game must be submodular.
Proof of Theorem 2. This theorem follows from the submodularity of our n player cooperative
game, because, as indicated by Driessen [7] and Topkis [24], any convex game must have a non-
empty core.
Proof of Theorem 3. A unique Shapley value (Shapley [21]) for center i can be computed by
using mi =
P
i2T (jT j   1)!(n  jT j)![v(T )  v(T   i)]=n!, where T is a possible coalition that center
i may join. To obtain mi, we rst identify all possible coalitions that involve center i.
1. If center i does not cooperate with any other centers but serves customers by itself, then only
coalition T = fig shall be considered; thus, we have,
(jT j   1)!(n  jT j)![v(T )  v(T   fig)]
n!
=
v(i)  v(?)
n
=
1
n
"
i

+  
s
i

#
.
2. We now assume that center i cooperates with other (k 1) call centers (2  k  n 1) to form
a k center coalition. Since any (k  1) call centers among (n  1) centers, exclusive of center
i, may cooperate with center i, there are
 
n 1
k 1

= (n  1)!=[(k  1)!(n  k)!] possible k-player
coalitions that center i joins. Denoting these
 
n 1
k 1

k-player coalitions (including center i) by
C(li; k), for li = 1; 2; : : : ;
 
n 1
k 1

and 2  k  n  1, we nd that, if jT j = k 2 [2; n  1], then,P
i2T (jT j   1)!(n  jT j)![v(T )  v(T   fig)]
n!
=
n 1X
k=2
8><>:(k   1)!(n  k)!n!
(n 1k 1)X
li=1
[v(li; k)  v(C(li; k)  fig)]
9>=>;
=
n 1X
k=2
8><>:(k   1)!(n  k)!n!
(n 1k 1)X
li=1

i

+
p

rX
j2C(li;k)
j  
rX
j2C(li;k)
j   i
9>=>; .
3. If call center i cooperates with other (n   1) centers, then all of n centers form the grand
4
Fair Sta¤ Allocation Rule Online Supplements
coalition C(n). That is, if T = C(n), then we have,
(jT j   1)!(n  jT j)![v(T )  v(T   fig)]
n!
=
v(n)  v(C(n)  fig)
n
=
1
n
24i

+  
0@sPnj=1 j

 
sPn
j=1 j   i

1A35 .
We summarize the above, and nd that the Shapley value-based sta¤ number for call center i,
i = 1; 2; : : : ; n can be calculated as,
mi =
nX
k=1
8><>:(k   1)!(n  k)!n!
(n 1k 1)X
li=1

i

+
p

rX
j2C(li;k)
j  
rX
j2C(li;k)
j   i
9>=>;
=
nX
k=1
264(k   1)!(n  k)!
n!

(n 1k 1)X
li=1

i

375
+
nX
k=1
8><>:(k   1)!(n  k)!n!
(n 1k 1)X
li=1

p

rX
j2C(li;k)
j  
rX
j2C(li;k)
j   i
9>=>; . (7)
The rst term in (7) can be simplied as,
nX
k=1
264(k   1)!(n  k)!
n!

(n 1k 1)X
li=1

i

375 = i

;
and the second term in (7) can be rewritten as
nX
k=1
8><>:(k   1)!(n  k)!n!
(n 1k 1)X
li=1

p

rX
j2C(li;k)
j  
rX
j2C(li;k)
j   i
9>=>; =  ip ,
where i is dened in (4). This theorem is thus proved.
Proof of Theorem 4. To prove that i <
p
i, we need to examine the term
qP
j2C(li;k) j  qP
j2C(li;k) j   i. Because s
i
X
j2C(li;k)
j   i

> 0,
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we have,rX
j2C(li;k)
j <
rX
j2C(li;k)
j   i+
p
i, or,
rX
j2C(li;k)
j  
rX
j2C(li;k)
j   i <
p
i.
Using the above, we nd that
i <
nX
k=1
264(k   1)!(n  k)!
n!
(n 1k 1)X
li=1
p
i
375
<
nX
k=1

(k   1)!(n  k)!
n!
(n  1)!
(k   1)!(n  k)!
p
i

<
nX
k=1

1
n
p
i

=
p
i.
This theorem is thus proved.
Proof of Corollary 1. If n call centers operate independently, the sta¤ number for call center
i (i = 1; 2; : : : ; n) equals v(i) = Ri +  
p
i=
p
. But, if n call centers form the grand coalition
C(n), then the Shapley value-characterized sta¤ number for call center i is mi = Ri +   i=p.
Thus the reduced sta¤ number for call center i is v(i) mi = (
p
i   i)=p.
Appendix C A Numerical Example
We consider a sta¢ ng problem involving three call centers (i = 1; 2; 3). Assume that customers
arrival rates for the three call centers are respectively, 1 = 100/hour, 2 = 120/hour, and
3 = 80/hour. These three call centers have an identical service rate,  = 150/hour. More-
over, for each call center, the per hour sta¤ cost and each customers per hour waiting cost are
a = $20/customer/hour and c = $5/hour, respectively. Since r = a=c = 4 is smaller than 10, Borst,
Mandelbaum, and Reiman [3] show that the term  in v(i) and v(l; k) (given in Section 3.1) can
be computed as
 =
s
r
1 + r 
p
=2  1
 = 1:41.
Next, we calculate the characteristic values of all possible coalitions for our cooperative sta¢ ng
game. As discussed previously, the characteristic value of empty coalition ? is zero, i.e., v(?) = 0.
According to (1), we compute the characteristic values of three one-player coalitions as
v(1) =
1

+ 
s
1

= 1:82, v(2) =
2

+ 
s
2

= 2:06, v(3) =
3

+ 
s
3

= 1:56.
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Then, using (2), we can compute other non-empty coalitionscharacteristic values as follows:
v(12) =
1 + 2

+ 
s
1 + 2

= 3:17, v(13) =
1 + 3

+ 
s
1 + 3

= 2:74,
v(23) =
2 + 3

+ 
s
2 + 3

= 2:96; v(123) =
1 + 2 + 3

+ 
s
1 + 2 + 3

= 3:99.
According to the above, our three-player cooperative sta¢ ng game is constructed as
v(?) = 0; v(1) = 1:82, v(2) = 2:06, v(3) = 1:56;
v(12) = 3:17, v(13) = 2:74, v(23) = 2:96; v(123) = 3:99.
Below we apply the formula given in Theorem 3 to allocate the grand coalitions sta¤ number 3.99
among the three call centers. That is, the Shapley value-characterized sta¤ number for call center
1 is computed as
m1 =
1

+
1
3
p

p
1 +
p
1 + 2 + 3  
p
2 + 3

+
1
6
p

p
1 + 2 +
p
1 + 3  
p
2  
p
3

= 1:33;
and the Shapley value-characterized sta¤ number for call center 2 is found as
m2 =
2

+
1
3
p

p
2 +
p
1 + 2 + 3  
p
1 + 3

+
1
6
p

p
1 + 2 +
p
2 + 3  
p
1  
p
3

= 1:56;
and the Shapley value-characterized sta¤ number for call center 3 is computed as
m3 =
3

+
1
3
p

p
3 +
p
1 + 2 + 3  
p
1 + 2

+
1
6
p

p
1 + 3 +
p
2 + 3  
p
1  
p
2

= 1:10.
Comparing v(i) and mi shows that mi < v(i), i = 1; 2; : : : ; n. Therefore, all call centers benet
from the centralized operation and the reduced sta¤ numbers for each center are, respectively,
(
p
1   1)=p = 0:49, (
p
2   2)=p = 0:5, and (
p
3   3)=p = 0:46.
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Consequently, the centers should be willing to stay in the grand coalition, which is stable.
8
